

181 Moreover, even though many jural details of life during the
178 'Ripublik' have now been forgotten, many attitudes and values of
that era, which, as noted, lasted until the advent of 'Abd al-Krim
[42] in 1921, are still fully present. The Rifian keeps an iron grip on
[52] what belongs to him, and this applies particularly to his womenfolk,
who, albeit highly respected, are kept equally secluded and segre-
[423] gated. Also, his land, poor as it may be, is his own and no one
[628] else's, in true "territorial imperative" style. But especially with
[554] the coming of the protectorate, the values underlying the bloodfeud,
[644] which was once the dominant political institution of the society,
were channeled into the newer direction of labor migration: in the
old days of the 'Ripublik', a man had to kill his enemy to make his
mark, while more recently he had to go out and get a job. (Until
[644] 1962 and Algerian Independence, work on the farms of French colons
in that country was the favored mode and region of labor migration,
while since that time the current has shifted to Western Europe.)

181 The Aith Waryaghar uprising against the Independent Moroccan Govern-
649 ment in 1958-1959 - which was forcibly put down by the new Royal Army
in its first post-Independence test of strength - was a graphic in-
dication, at the tribal level, that the old values of Rifian "apart-
ness" within the wider national Moroccan society are still resistant
to change, for despite its "modern" objectives, the uprising itself
was carried out in a "traditional", "take-to-the-hills" manner. And
these same values are even more discernible, today as in Blanco's
621 time, at the level of the jma'th, the local community. Community life
671 among the Aith Waryaghar is both intense and inner-directed, as, for

000 50--The fact of whether or not women inherit (informants invariably say that they do, according to the Shari'a, but they tend, by their actions, to prove the contrary) is a crucial question in Berber social organization. This has been nicely perceived by Blanco, whose opinions on the subject will be treated in their proper place.

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51--This prognostication made by Blanco has yet to come true, as the revolt in late 1958 and early 1959 staged by the Aith Waryaghar against the Moroccan government has abundantly proven. Tribal "we-feeling" and "the sociopolitical importance of the group"--at whatever level of segmentation--seems to us to be as strong as ever.

[829]

52--This is a most interesting notion, and one which is never expressed as such by Rifians but implied in most of their actions, behavior and conversation.

[114]

53--Blanco is in effect trying to define each of the Rifian social units in a state of isolation, as it were, from the others, and trying to take them out of context. In so doing, he advocates, in effect, rigid definitions when what is called for is fluid ones. Small wonder, therefore, that he admits his task to be difficult!

54--In the original, ramas familiares--and, as I have stated earlier, what the jajgu is in fact is a lineage branch of the dhārfiqth, and can only be adequately discussed in the light of the latter--or, in anthropological terms, in the light of a total system of segmentary lineage organization.

55--Blanco's argument, when boiled down, is as follows: the jajgu or azwar is a social unit which is essentially the result of polygyny, and if a man has descendants reckoned agnatically from three wives, each of these three sets of descendants form the nucleus of a jajgu which takes a uterine descent from the wife in question as its point of departure.

This, of course, is preposterous. Given a perfectly genuine situation, Blanco has drawn conclusions which are entirely erroneous. He would have us believe, in effect, that matrilineal descent may exist, under certain conditions, in a patrilineal society! Hardly. The fact of the matter is that 1) even though ijujga may originate from the descendants of different wives of the same man; and 2) even though one or more of these wives may come from a clan or tribe other than that of her or their husband--in which case the name of the jajgu may reflect her origin or even her name, although even so it is invariably preceded by that of her son; even in instances of this kind, descent is always reckoned through the male line, and the patrilineal principle obtains throughout. Polygyny is in no way a function of uterine descent, even though there may be evidences of matronymy; and the only mitigating factor in Blanco's hypothesis is that from an overall standpoint, he himself still entertains some doubts about its validity.

56--This is a very good and well-taken point indeed, and goes a considerable way toward explaining why, particularly with respect to issues of wider scope than those within, say, the clan, the statements of different informants (often) tend to vary so greatly. We would go even further: we believe that such ambiguity is absolutely inherent

000 from the individual member and, today, to subvention the most urgent needs of worship abandoned by the central authorities.

The Statute of the Jma'th

My long sojourns in tribal territory, at different levels of command, and my stumbling upon the jma'ath, surprised me at first, then made me take a second look, and finally made me appreciate them. The Rifian and the European (Spanish) authorities will find only profit in the observation, reception and revitalization of this institution. Whoever does not know the "play" of the jma'ath or does not utilize it is either building on sand or will become a despot whose alarms will disturb him and whose labors will not survive. I have reflected many times upon how little or nothing would remain, in case of a new revolt against all our improvisations and innocent classifications. No matter how many times the Rifian has declared himself to be in a state of rebellion, he has returned to take refuge in his jma'th with an extraordinary stavism which nothing would indicate has disappeared.¹⁶

For this reason I believe that any new legislative measure must aim at providing a channel in which the activity of the jma'th can develop, providing these localized political groupings with official status and interesting them in active collaboration (with the administration); and thus might be avoided the fact that they might torpedo the Makhzin's decisions. What is needed is to recognize that they have a personality and, in a word, to strengthen them, instead of ignoring

• (669) 16--In view of the events of the Aith Waryaghar rebellion against the
(648) central authorities of Independent Morocco in 1958-1959, this is a highly prophetic remark.

/295 cont./

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648 in the creation of a kind of political chessboard analogous to the one that we found among the Masmouda, subsided for a time.

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726 Several years of peace -- from 1898 to 1903 -- were fol-
lowed by the passing of the pretender Bou Hamara and soon by
the intervention of Spain on the coasts of the Rif beginning from
[648] 1909. Anarchy broke out anew; other leffs were again constituted
[616] among the two rival fractions of Targist, winning all the country
[634] from the West to the East, from the Beni Gmil to the Beni Amret.
It was in the course of these combats that there then appeared and
grew important such amghars as El Hajj Beqqich, in the north of
the Gzennaya, Mohammed 'Abdallah of the Ija'ounen, in the
tribe of the Beni Amret, Mesa'oud of Aqqa among the Beni Gmil.

634
[171] /296/ These minor chiefs then are masters more absolute in
their tribes than the Masmouda amghars of the same importance;
they do not find themselves in fact inconvenienced by the tradi-
tion of the oligarchic inflas councils, nor by the memory of the
moqaddem's role. Nevertheless, like the amghars of the Haut-
[17] Atlas /High Atlas/, they share with the notables the fines paid by
[681] the guilty, taking a third when they are still weak and nearly all
[434] when they have solidly established their power. In the cantons
that they dominate, they establish other amghars chosen from
[614] among the strongest "tarfiqt" chiefs and bind them to them by
[581] marriages. The authority that they acquire in this way is such
that they are capable of conducting far and wide, across the
neighboring tribes, expeditions to a distance of a day's march,
in order to go to make their word respected and to punish their
adversaries. El Hajj Beqqich did this; leaving from the sources of
the Nkor, he went with his horsemen to wreak vengeance on his
enemies as far as Ajdir.

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721 At the time of the great movement for a holy war against
634 Spain in 1921, the amghars figured at the head of the Riffian con-
648 tingents. We see them take part with ardor in the battle of
[669] Anoual. But when 'Abd el Kerim, his relatives and companions
from the village of Ajdir take, by means of the "Jihad," the
command of the Beni Ouriaghel, organize a little state, bend the
surrounding tribes to their will in order better to direct the fight

/296 cont./

175 against the Christians, the amghars, aided by the marabouts, try
 721 to take back the power that escapes them; it is they who will
 634 direct the revolt of 1924, which for a time will threaten the work
 648 of the Riffian chief. Defeated in that supreme endeavor, they
 669 will perish, the majority by poison or in the dungeons of Ajdir and
 Tamassint.

634 In spite of the real power that the amghars of the Rif can
 554 succeed in obtaining, their authority nevertheless remains pre-
 182 carious. Based entirely on force, born amidst the conflict of
 598 unstable leffs, deprived of the support of oligarchic traditions, it
 exists only very rarely after the disappearance of the one who
 created it. The hostile forces directed by the anarchic clans and
 the marabouts rapidly stop their endeavor. The social material
 appears too rebellious; so the rough outline of personal power re-
 mains unfinished; the amghar succeeds in asserting himself only in
 his canton of origin; we do not see him succeed anywhere, by the
 force of his power alone, in breaking the narrow frontiers of the
 fraction, /297/ the boundaries of a leff, and in conquering a true
 [721] tribe. 'Abd el Kerim alone in this region, carried by other forces,
 [648] will succeed, thanks to the enthusiasm of the holy war, in estab-
 lishing a powerful domination and in founding for a time a true
 Berbère /Berber/ state.

000 XIII. The chiefs of the Kabylie /Kabylia/. -- Masqueray has
 studied well the difficult conditions in which the authority of the
 soff chief whose ambition is to conquer supreme power in his tribe
 can develop in Kabylie /Kabylia/. The political state of the
 villages of the Djurdjura /Djurdjura/, divided into two hostile
 parties, almost always balanced, but which are ceaselessly re-
 newed and do not have the permanence of the leffs of the Mas-
 mouda, is no more favorable than the anarchic Rif for the estab-
 lishment of a strong and stable personal power.

Nevertheless the analogies between the Kabylie /Kabylia/
 and the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ remain numerous. Rich and
 brave, the future amghar in the Djurdjura begins by being only the
 head of a family or of a soff. When his party wins, it remains for
 him to have his effective superiority accepted by the members of

/401 cont./

000 day attached /402/ to their republican traditions and opposed by incessant wars. At least we may say that their appearance, almost unaccountable at first sight if one thinks of the loyalty maintained by the Kabyles to their egalitarian constitutions, is illuminated when one grants that the country in which they grew was divided into territorial leffs several centuries ago and was covered by a chessboard of small tribes opposed in two alliances, analogous to that of the western Atlas in our time. From then on, one can admit the same causes engendering the same effects, that amghars of cantons and tribes of Kabylie /Kabylia/ succeeded in rising, by means of leff ties, by forming principalities similar to the ones of the great kaid of the country of the Masmouda.

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631 The most recent example that we can cite is also the one conforming most to our previous conclusions. Under our eyes, the last chief of Berbère /Berber/ independence, Mohammed ben 'Abd el Kerim /Abd-el-Krim/, has, as a matter of fact, just tried to create a state in the anarchic Rif, while obeying, doubtless without knowing it, principles that his predecessors must have followed in other regions of the Maghreb.

[648] The Riffian chief appears to us, in fact, from the first battles that precede the Spanish rout of 1921, as a mere notable of the Beni Ouriaghel; his Anoual victory makes of him only a "war leader," whose authority remains limited and precarious. At that moment there was nothing that could make his surprising career foreseen. But then he becomes aware of his mission. We see him first of all silencing the very keen rivalry of the soffs in his tribe; [578] after stopping the private wars among the Beni Ouriaghel, his [619] brothers, he forms a Riffian Makhzen, to which the riparian tribes of the bay of Alhucemas, Boqqoya, Beni Ouriaghel, Temsaman, Beni Touzin contribute their best elements, as the Masmouda of the Nefis formerly grouped themselves around Ibn Tountert,

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648 Mahdi of the Almohades. In the manner of the great chiefs of the Atlas, he then chooses his harka leaders and his caliphates from his tribe of origin; he makes warriors from his village of Ajdir his counselors and confidential men. Next, having thus ensured the fortune of his clan, of his village, of his tribe, and

175 /402 cont./
631

of the tribes of the vicinity. 'Abd el Kerim can easily tame the revolts of the Rif fomented by the minor amghars of the Ghomara, /403/ jealous of the development of his power; soon he completes his successes by the conquest of the Jbel and makes his rival Raisouli perish in prison.

175 Four years sufficed to make of the son of the cadì of Ajdir the
631 independent Sultan of the north of Morocco, who keeps the
554 armies of Spain at bay; carried away by his ambition, by the en-
[648] thusiasm and cupidity of his entourage, 'Abd el Kerim then
dreams for an instant of conquering the towns of the Maghreb and becoming master of all the Mussulmans of Morocco, whose eyes turn toward him with growing admiration. Indeed, each day that passes increases his prestige; he becomes, in the eyes of western Islam, a new Moustapha /Mustafa/ Kemal; his name is known from the Indies to America, and people follow his victories and projects with a passionate interest; the large countries of Europe are stirred up by the importance that he is acquiring and, according to their interests, secretly desire his success or hope for his ruin.

175 A few weeks of well-directed military efforts moreover suffice
631 to get rid of the "Riffian State." But the conditions under which
182 this Berbère /Berber/ kingdom, so rapidly built up and at the same
648 time so fragile, suddenly collapses enable us to see its internal structure clearly.

During the first phase of the war, the struggle between the Rif, France, and Spain was carried on to the boundary of the tribes conquered and governed by the Beni Ouriaghel; so the efforts of two large modern armies remained in vain because the members of the Riffian Makhzen /makhzan/ always succeeded in constraining all the populations of the mountains of the north of Morocco to continue the holy war, the "jihad," without sparing their forces; but when the territory of the Beni Ouriaghel itself is threatened, the warriors of 'Abd el Kerim's tribe all abandon at the same time their external commands in the tribes of the Jbala and the Wergha in order to come to defend their own homes; the grip exerted by the tribal brothers of the "Sultan of the Rif" on all the small